Chapter 2
Reality and/ or Interpretation in The Ambassadors
In his preface to The Ambassadors, James explains that he represents the people, objects, and events in the novel's world through "Strether's sense of these things" -that is, "through his more or less groping knowledge of them, since his very gropings would figure among his most interesting motions."1 By focusing on Strether's "groping" efforts to understand, James transforms the composing powers of consciousness into the central action of his narrative. Strether's uncertainties and his conflicts with other inter preters make a crucial dramatic issue out of such epistemological questions as whether reality is single or multiple, a determinate entity independent of the observer or a variable realm that can accommodate radical disagree ments. The Ambassadors is a classic example of the interdependence of James' s hermeneutic explorations and his experiments with narrative struc ture. By giving the question of how Strether understands as much impor tance as what he seeks to know, James attempts not only to represent a world but at the same time to lay bare the epistemology of world construction.
James has long been known, of course, as the champion of point of view in fiction. But this term has become somewhat worn from overuse. As some recent critics have recognized, it is consequently necessary to reex amine the great variety of narrative techniques for representing conscious ness and to describe them more precisely than such terms as point of view, ' Henry James, The Art of the Novel, ed. R. P. Blackmur (New Yo rk: Scribner's, 1934) , pp. 317-18. stream of consciousness, or interior monologue allow. 2 But it is not enough to define only the formal fe atures of these techniques. Different methods for rendering consciousness project different theories of knowledge or high light different aspects of human understanding. A particular strategy for depicting the life of the mind will not be adequately understood until its hermeneutic implications have been explored. This is the kind of analysis that my studies of James, Conrad, and Ford attempt to supply.
James' s portraits of consciousness emphasize the epistemological impli cations of methods for depicting the mind. James is not interested in consciousness simply as an arena of technical experimentation. It fascinates him because it is the home of meaning. How do we create and construe meaning, why do interpretations differ, and what does hermeneutic conflict imply about the status of reality-these are questions of fundamental importance to James. To ask these questions he focuses on consciousness because consciousness is the activity of making and interpreting meaning. James never forgets that the meaning-making activities of the mind are always situated in a field of cultural codes that are both limiting and enabling. But unlike some of the more radical postmodernists, James never doubts that consciousness is the foundation of the world of signs. This is the classicism in his modernism. It also suggests his humanism.
The Ambassadors gives evidence of James's hermeneutic humanism in its exploration of the relation between morality and interpretation. This novel pointedly asks whether it is possible, in a world of conflicting interpreta tions, to develop an ethics that is not undermined by its relativity. Here, as before, James is both a member of the great tradition and a harbinger of the modem. Interpretation is itself a moral activity for James because understanding others can lead to ethical self-awareness (as it does for Strether) and to a justifiable moral choice (although perhaps not a necessary and certain one). In the much-debated ambiguity ofStrether's final decision, for example, James asserts a moral resolution in the tradition of the eight eenth-and nineteenth-century novel-but questions it at the same time by suggesting that it is disputable, as are all ethical choices in a world without indubitable hierarchies of meaning and value.
If James believes that the real is ultimately discoverable and that a moral sense is attainable, that is because he thinks suspicion and faith can be reconciled. But he also acknowledges the potential for conflict in both ethics and interpretation because doubt and belief can take many different forms and because their opposition to each other can sometimes resist resolution. 3 The Ambassadors and The Sacred Fo unt show the two sides of this coin. The narrator of The Sacred Fo unt overextends himself as an interpreter and fails to grow in self-knowledge or moral awareness because he takes suspicion and faith to extremes instead of reconciling them. Extreme in his suspicions of hidden sides around him, he increases his risk of delusion by unmasking as lies all signs that might falsify his hypotheses; extreme in his faith in his theories, he is guilty of a fixation of belief which makes him particularly vulnerable to refutation from opposing views.
Suspicion and faith clash in The Ambassadors, but they eventually attain at least a partial synthesis. Wo ollett's skepticism about Paris clashes with Strether's revelatory trust in Chad' s transformation and the virtue of his attachment with Madame de Vionnet. But Strether ultimately corrects his excessive fa ith and replaces it with belief tempered by criticism. This is the road to reality for James-belief and doubt mutually cor recting each other. It is also the road to a moral sense-belief in possibility balanced against suspicion oflimitation, sympathetic faith in others joined with skepticism about their hidden sides. After resolving belief and doubt, however, The Ambassadors ends by dissociating them once again. Irrec oncilable disagreement divides Strether's perspective from the convictions and suspicions of those he leaves in Paris and returns to in America. The two sides of Henry James-the realist and the student of interpretation, the monist and the pluralist-are evident here once again. The Ambassadors asserts that suspicion and faith can attain a stable, single equilibrium only to demonstrate that their balance is at best tenuous and subject to infinite permutations.
Ford and Conrad inquire differently and more radically into the recon cilability of doubt and belie( Suspicion and faith are further dissociated, less reconcilable, in Ford than in James. Dowell shifts from blissful igno rance to enlightened despair in contrast to Strether's growth to appreciation and resignation. Similarly stymied and beleaguered, Tietjens and Va lentine retreat to the private, rural life because the social world is hostile to life enhancing convictions and values, its motto "Kill" instead of "Cure." This dissociation comes to a crisis in Conrad, where Marlow and Decoud find that to doubt beliefs is to tempt nihilistic darkness-unlike Strether, whose disillusionment and conflict with others lead to the development of con- victions that are stronger for having weathered suspicion. Strether plays with beliefs and doubts in building interpretive constructs to understand his world, but Conrad' s characters question the very basis of our sustaining illusions. In the movement from James's two-sidedness about their pros pects for reconciliation to Conrad's radical confrontation of faith by skep ticism, literary impressionism begins the debate in modem fiction about how, if at all, we can find our way through the maze of conflicting declarations of belief and calls for skepticism which characterize a pluralistic umverse.
"Mysteries, mysteries: he stands in a world of mystery."4 So James describes Strether' s situation in the preliminary synopsis of the novel. A perplexed character in a mystifying world, Strether is not simply a quester for moral truth or a detective with a vexing puzzle to solve. His bewilder ment makes strange what he had taken for granted about reality and ethics. Bombarded by "new and unexpected assaults and infusions," Strether is transported from the everyday attitude of understanding into a state of wonder about the world. 5 Interpretation thwarted and his deepest assump tions challenged, Strether moves from tacit understanding to active reflec tion about what he knows and how he knows it. The problems of interpretation before him make interpretation problematic and call its workings into question.
Strether the Interpreter: Groping for Reality

Crisis in Understanding
Strether's story belongs to James's studies of the " 'international' conflict of manners"-"a general theme dealing for the most part," according to one preface, "with the bewilderment of the good American, of either sex and of almost any age, in presence of the 'European' order."6 Strether is just such a bewildered American. The many disorientations he suffers show that James approaches the international scene not only as a historian of manners but also as a student of interpretation for whom the clash of different worlds challenges our complacency about how we understand 4Henry James, "Project of Novel by Henry James," in The Notebooks of Henry Ja mes, and what reality is. Strether's experiences in Paris have the effect of"sweep ing away, as by a last brave brush, his usual landmarks and terms."7 Again and again he finds himself baffied because events have "taken all his cate gories by surprise" (1:271). In Wo ollett the world may have seemed stable, determinate, and independent ofinterpretation-"real," pure and simple because the "categories" and "terms" that made it up were never radically questioned. Strether' s bewilderment in Paris reveals that his earlier reality was only an interpretive construct, a framework of assumptions and hy potheses now cast into bold reliefbecause they have been surprised. Strether says at one point that "surprise is paralysing, or at any rate engrossing" (1:168). And it is both for him: "paralysing" because the many surprises he meets undermine his interpretive framework, but "engrossing" because the unfamiliar is fascinating and novelty is invigorating, a challenge to reflection and more active efforts at understanding.
Strether fe els "the emotion of bewilderment" (1:136) most strongly, perhaps, when he first sees Chad at the theater and senses that the young man has been somehow transformed. Their encounter provides a small scale model of the general crisis in understanding which overtakes Strether in Paris. Chad's transformation raises basic questions about meaning, inter pretation, and reality. Strether fe els that he had been prepared for anything, "but that Chad should not be Chad" (1:136-37; original emphasis). And he asks himself: "what could be more remarkable than this sharp rupture of an identity? Yo u could deal with a man as himself-you couldn't deal with him as somebody else" (1:137). Something receives its identity by its difference from something else, but Chad's difference from himself com pels Strether to reconsider the whole issue of the stability and dependability of the world. The disruption in Chad suggests that identity depends on continuity, the self-sameness of something across repeated encounters with it. Chad's transformation gives Strether a fe eling of vertigo, and his uneasy sense of lost bearings suggests that the seeming determinacy of the "real" is an assumption based on its consistency-a consistency here disturbingly violated. Because Chad' s change radically defies Strether's expectations of sameness, his sense of reality is momentarily undermined.
Given the extent of the young man's transformation, it may seem curious that Strether attributes such importance to "the marked streaks of grey, extraordinary at [Chad's] age, in his thick black hair" (1:140). This is the 7Henry James, The Ambassadors, in The Novels and Tales of Henry Ja mes (New Yo rk: Scribner's, 1909), 21:195 . Subsequent references will be given parenthetically in the text and will cite the work's two volumes as "1" and "2. " only visible detail of Chad's change the reader is given, and Strether returns to it almost obsessively, "as if so very much more than he could have said had been involved in it" (1:142). He even imagines a telegram to Wo ollett to tell of the new Chad in just four words: ''Awfully old-grey hair" (1:142). The color of Chad's hair is so significant because it is a part that will not fit the whole. To Strether it seems to stand for the many anomalies that have defied his hermeneutic c0nstructs. The ironic contrast between the smallness of this anomaly and the great many dilemmas of interpre tation it leads to calls attention to the dialectic between the small and the large in the process of composing parts into a whole. The puzzle of Chad's gray hair exemplifies the requirement that interpretation compose its ele ments into a consistent configuration-a process foregrounded here be cause it is blocked.
Strether's response to this anomaly further demonstrates James's sense that interpretation is an act of composition. Just as the narrator of The Sacred Fount searches for laws to organize the anomalies he sees into a logic of transformation, so Strether seeks types and formulas to understand Chad. For example, in attempting to make sense of Chad's manner in the cafe after the theater, Strether defines it "as that of a man of the world-a formula that indeed seemed to come now in some degree to his relief; that of a man to whom things had happened and were variously known" ( 1: 152). This formula reassures Strether because it organizes otherwise anomalous elements of behavior into a coherent pattern. It fits Chad into a framework for understanding which can serve to orient Strether in the future. But its vagueness suggests that it still needs considerable refinement and testing, and its triteness reflects Strether's naivete as a bewildered American whose categories have been overwhelmed by Paris. Strether runs into a characteristic and revealing kind of trouble in his first attempt to refine his formula for the new Chad. Wo ndering what sort of"man of the world" Chad is, Strether "asked himselfifhe weren't perhaps really dealing with an irreducible young Pagan. . . . Pagan-yes, that was, wasn't it? what Chad would logically be. It was what he must be. It was what he was. The idea was a clue and, instead of darkening the prospect, projected a certain clearness" (1:156-57; original emphasis). The phrase "perhaps really" suggests how much Strether's reality is a structure of hypotheses. This is reinforced by his subsequent movement from the interrogative ("wasn't it?") to the assertive ("must be") to the declarative ("It was what he was"). Strether's new hypothesis seems vindicated by its effectiveness, its power to lead to further revelations and refinements.
"Pagan'' is still a large category, however, and its almost comic generality comments on how desperately Strether searches for labels to identify and place the confusingly nameless. The "pagan'' is a familiar notion that may help assimilate the strange, but the banal association it implies between Paris and Babylon ironically emphasizes Strether's ignorance even as he tries to overcome it. By invoking the "pagan," Strether turns to metaphor to reinscribe his world with similarities and differences where identity had seemed upset by discontinuity. But the clash between the image of a heathen it projects and the picture of urbanity Chad makes portends further difficulties of interpretation for Strether.
These arise almost immediately, and the bright prospect turns dark when Chad charges Wo ollett with "a low mind" (1:16o) for its suspicions. Strether finds himself at an impasse once again: "He had been wondering a minute ago if the boy weren't a Pagan, and he found himself wondering now if he weren't by chance a gentleman. It didn't in the least, on the spot, spring up helpfully for him that a person couldn't at the same time be both. There was nothing at this moment in the air to challenge the com bination; there was everything to give it on the contrary something of a flourish" (1:160). Pagan or gentleman? The conflict of interpretations has been broached in the clash between these mutually exclusive hypotheses. Both seem equally able to make sense of the anomalous Chad, but their contradiction raises questions that animate the rest of the novel: Does one construct fa lsify the other, or can both lead to equally tenable if opposite interpretations? Is the choice between them a choice between truth and falsity, or a choice between competing modes of understanding based on different cultural allegiances and ethical values? Is reality single and deter minate, or multiple and variable according to interpretation? Chad begs these questions (but leaves Strether with them) by the vague assurance: " 'Oh I'm all right!' It was what Strether had rather bewilderedly to go to bed on" (1:161). If Strether suffered confusion earlier because he lacked a schema for understanding Chad, his bewilderment here reflects his inability to reconcile opposing frameworks for construing him. Comically and ironically, a paucity of interpretive constructs has been replaced by an equally unsettling surplus of them.
This conflict between alternative interpretations is prefigured and pre pared for, of course, by Strether's ambivalent state of mind before meeting Chad. Although "everything was so totally different" than he had antici pated (Strether thinks during his talk with the young man), Maria Gostrey had already introduced the alternatives "Pagan or gentleman?" by sug-gesting that Chad "may have got brutalised" or "he may have got refined" (1:149, 69). As Mrs. Newsome's emissary to retrieve her lost son, Strether must share Wo ollett's dogmatic view that a vulgar Parisian woman has ruined Chad. But buoyed by "such a consciousness of personal freedom as he hadn't known for years" ( 1 :4), Strether barely manages to suppress "an almost envious vision of the boy's romantic privilege" by assuming that Chad "had, after all, simply . . . been too vulgar" to appreciate it (1:90, 94).
Strether' s "double consciousness" (1:5) shows once again james's interest in how expectation guides understanding. Because Strether is internally at odds with himself, tom between conflicting attitudes toward Europe (den of iniquity, home of possibility) and correspondingly toward Chad (vulgar, privileged) , he is more open to a change in his horizons, more prepared to recognize novelty and seek to accommodate it, than he would be with a unified consciousness. Unburdened (or unblessed) by ambivalence, Sarah Pocock by contrast sees nothing anomalous about Chad. She finds only what she expects to discover, and Paris creates no crisis for her. The other side of this coin, however, is that Strether's internal conflict may also make him an easy target for deceptions that take advantage of his willingness to believe in the promise of Paris. The pair of possibilities generated by Strether' s ambivalence-openness to novelty, vulnerability to deception testify to the dependence of what we see on what we anticipate.
Openness requires faith in the undisclosed, while deception calls for suspicion of it. The choice between trust and unmasking is crucial for Strether because Paris is a wo r ld of hidden sides, "a maze of mystic closed allusions" (1:279). Questions about the hidden, about what is beyond or behind, are deeply implicated in Chad's transformation: Who is the woman responsible for it? Is she "a mere wretch" or "a good woman," even an "excellent" one (1:16<)-70)? And is their relation "a virtuous attachment"
(1:180), as little Bilham claims? Unlike the narrator of The Sacred Fo unt, who assumes without hesitation that to understand is to unmask, the bewildered Strether alternates uncertainly between opposed rules for read ing-revelatory trust that what lies beyond conforms to the indications of the side open to view, versus skepticism that what is behind uses the surface as a disguise. At dinner with little Bilham and Miss Barrace in Chad's absence, for example, Strether fe ars that he is walking into "the most baited, the most gilded of traps" ( 1: 1 13 ). But he also wants to believe Miss Gostrey's defense of "the happy attitude itself, the state of faith and-what shall I call it?-the sense of beauty" ( 1: 13 1 ). After much hesitancy, many scruples, and a great deal of worry, Strether resolves his hermeneutic crisis (or so he thinks) by converting from skepticism to faith and abandoning "his odious ascetic suspicion of any form of beauty" (1:193-94 The preeminence of the lie in Strether' s story suggests not only that the hidden sides of others pose a mystery for interpretation but also that the world is a universe of signs. If meaning referred straightforwardly to reality, no one could lie. But since signs can only be explicated by still other signs, and since what they present always remains absent, every use of signs implies the possibility of deception. 8 The role of the lie in The Ambassadors reveals the two fundamental functions of signs by subverting them-first, how they mediate between their users, bringing them together in com munication but still leaving them separate; and second, how they disclose 8See Umberto Eco, A Theory of Semiotics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976), pp. 6-7, 58-59, I 16, 178-80. a situation, making it present but also distancing it, inasmuch as signs are substitutes, representatives, which defer and withhold what they stand for and bring forth.
The very title of the novel invokes the use of signs because an ambassador is a mediator and a representative. Not merely a vehicle for mock heroic comedy, the diplomatic apparatus is also an elaborate metaphor for the problems of communication and disclosure which signs entail. Sent over to Paris when Chad's letters home stop, Strether's first mission is to restore communication and get a first-hand view of the delinquent's situation. The novel's point of departure is thus a breakdown in the function of signs, and its goal is their repair. Once in Paris, however, Strether finds himself repeatedly put off and forced to deal with substitutes. Chad is absent at first, represented by little Bilham and Miss Barrace. Strether must read them and Chad's apartments as signs of the missing young man, substitutes that defer him but also tell of him. Instead of ending the chain of substi tutions, however, Chad's arrival begins a new one, since Strether regards him as a representative of the missing woman who has transformed him. This dialectic of disclosure and deferral continues after she arrives, in the question of what lies behind her attachment with Chad. Interpretation comes to a crisis for Strether, then, because the signs he must construe reveal only by disguising and thereby bring to prominence the structure of representation and substitution at the heart of meaning.
The dimensions of interpretation which Strether's crisis highlights understanding as an activity of constructing hypotheses, with the related issues of hidden sides and absence-are paralleled by James's representa tional practice. Consider, for example, one of the most notorious objects in the novel's world, the unspecified article produced at Wo ollett. Instead of arranging spots of indeterminacy to portray an object in an aspect, James here leaves a gap that offers a self-conscious comment on the role of blanks in traditional fiction. Strether' s conversation about the article with Maria Gostrey resembles a parlor game of twenty questions. She asks: Is it "improper or ridiculous or wrong"? No, it's not "unmentionable," Strether replies-only "a small, trivial, rather ridiculous object of the commonest domestic use," with the added clue that "It's vulgar." " 'Rather ridiculous'?," she muses; "Clothes-pins? Saleratus? Shoe-polish?" To which Strether answers: "No-you don't even 'burn' " (1:6o-6 1). Maria Gostrey does what most readers do with realistic fiction. Given aspects of an object, she attempts to build and blend them into a consistent whole. She takes what is said and, by following its lead, attempts to fill out the unsaid. This is also what Strether does in trying to fathom Chad, what the young man accuses Wo ollett of ("you must have filled out. . . . you must have imag ined"; 1:155-56), and what Miss Gostrey manages successfully in the rest of this conversation in correctly guessing Strether's situation from the clues he offers. By blocking the work of gap filling and consistency building, however, James elevates the activity of projecting hypotheses in understand ing and reading from an implicit process into an explicit theme. 9
Miss Gostrey relishes the blank Strether leaves: "In ignorance she could humour her fancy, and that proved a useful freedom" (1:61). As in The Tu rn of the Screw, where James refuses to specify the evil that threatens the children, an explicit gap is an incitement to the reader' s imagination. The mystery of the unspecified product should set the reader's imagination to work in evoking Wo ollett-encouraging an identification of the article's traits with the entire community ("common," "domestic," "vulgar") since they do not limit their range of reference by stabilizing around an object. But prominently displayed gaps may also frustrate the reader's efforts to make the novel's world come together and assume a mantle of concreteness. James' s treatment of Mrs. Newsome is similarly a double process of man ifesting and withholding. As the preliminary statement explains, Mrs.
Newsome is paradoxically "always out of it, yet always of it, always absent, yet always fe lt."10 The absent presence of Mrs. Newsome is typical of the refusal of objects in the late James to emerge straightforwardly. They almost always hold something of themselves back, shrouded in uncertainty and immateriality. Now all objects even in the most realistic fiction are insub stantial. Their concreteness is an illusion that the synthesizing activity of the reader creates. In evoking an object but then keeping it back, James sets this process in motion only to prevent its completion. This blockage foregrounds the inevitable indeterminacy of represented objects instead of attempting to overcome it. James's self-consciousness about interpretation and representation is at the heart of the debate over Paris that are concretely held and presented" in the novel, F. R. Leavis asks what is "symbolized by Paris": "Is it anything adequately realized?" or "haven't we to take the symbol too much at the glamorous face-value it has for Strether?"11 This complaint, like many others directed against the late style, arises because James tries not only to represent a world but also (and perhaps even more) to prompt reflection about mimesis and interpreta tion-here the role of metaphor in both. Although The Ambassadors offers a considerable amount of such geographical detail as street names, build ings, and parks, Paris is essentially a trope for Strether-a figure that projects a world and that offers constructs for understanding his situation. Strether habitually invokes synecdoche to signify Paris, parts that stand for the whole to him, like lemon-covered novels or his extravagant purchase of Hugo. The growth of Strether's understanding can be charted by the increasing refinement in his metaphors for construing the Parisian scene from the naive figure of "the vast bright Babylon'' that "hung before him" vaguely and intriguingly "like some huge iridescent object, a jewel brilliant and hard" (1:89), to his dramatically compelling, sympathetically illumi nating invocation of Madame Roland on the scaffold during the Reign of Te rror to appreciate Madame de Vionnet's suffering and doom near the end (see 2:275).
As readers we are called on less to see Paris through the organizing power of metaphor-a power that, as Auerbach has shown, realistic nov elists such as Balzac and Flaubert employ in seeking mimesis through poesis-than to evaluate Strether's use of figures as tools for understand ing. 12 Where realism uses metaphors to build a lifelike world, James asks his readers to reflect about the role of tropes in constructing reality. Al though Leavis recognizes that the Paris of The Ambassadors is a symbol, he values the concrete, the presentational, the realized which, to his mind, the "doing" should devote itself to. By dramatizing and questioning the her meneutic function of metaphor, James risks sacrificing immersion in the world of Paris-an immersion that would take the symbol at its represen tational face value. Because we as readers must constantly criticize and 
470-74).
judge the epistemological value of Strether's figures before deciding whether to give ourselves over to what they project, the act of reading The Ambassadors entails more contemplation of abstract phenomena than most conventionally realistic fiction does.
The reader of realism alternates between immersion in a represented world and criticism of what is found there. Aesthetically minded readers may also contemplate how a novel's objects are displayed. The reader of
The Ambassadors alternates between participation in hermeneutic processes and reflection about them. By thematizing the perspectives his characters have on their worlds, James compels the reader to attend as much to how objects emerge as to what they are. James's reader is called upon not only to concretize the objects in Strether's world but also to observe and analyze how he struggles to find hypotheses that would piece them together and complete their indeterminacies. These two activities can sometimes inter fe re with each other, and when they do, precedence usually goes to her meneutic reflection. James's reader is typically not given the immediate inducement of involvement in a represented world before being asked to reflect about it. The reverse is often the case. Customarily in the late works we can win through to involvement with concretized people, places, and things only after self-consciously analyzing and criticizing the perspectives through which they are offered. During Strether's first meeting with Chad, for example, the paucity of detail given to describe him prevents the reader from developing a coherent, concrete image of the young man. Chad is presented in a distinctly limited array of aspects-his striking gray hair, "a frank friendly look," and little more as he stands at the back of Strether's box (1:138). What we have at great length are Strether's reflections about the young man as they wait for the intermission and then talk in the cafe. James does not encourage the reader to construct an illusion of Chad's full, immediate presence by combining and completing representational aspects. Instead of building up the object of Strether' s concern through a series of mutually reinforcing aspects, James interrupts and restricts their unfolding so that he can focus our attention on how Strether struggles to compose a coherent interpre tation. Consistency building is transformed from an implicit process in reading into an explicit theme for contemplation. Rather than picturing Chad, we observe Strether trying to find formulas for him to fill in elements that are missing or hidden. Chad is simultaneously presented and held at a distance because James depicts Strether's perspective on him instead of offering him to us through perspectives.
If as James's readers we are asked more to contemplate hermeneutic procedures than to immerse ourselves in a represented world, our relation to Strether is nevertheless not entirely detached and reflective. Because we are hindered from involving ourselves immediately with the objects in Strether's world, we are called on to join him in projecting hypotheses about them. To the extent that we as readers are not given a coherent, full picture of Chad, we too must speculate about his indeterminate, hidden qualities. A paradoxical effect may result. We may find ourselves more engaged in Strether' s plight than we might otherwise be because we too share his hermeneutic quandaries. Or we may find ourselves at an ironic or even comic distance from him to the extent that our guesses about what is disguised or as yet undisclosed diverge from his. Or we may move back and forth between engagement in his interpretive puzzles and contempla tion of his quest for sense-making hypotheses.
Either of these activities-projecting interpretations about Strether' s world or critically examining his hermeneutic speculations-will demand from readers more abstract cognitive activity than we customarily expend when swept away by an illusion of reality. This demand for "close or analytic appreciation," as James calls it, may strain the reader and lead to complaints. 13 But they are less justified with The Ambassadors than with The Sacred Fount for several reasons. To begin with, the later novel never undercuts itself by questioning the importance of the hermeneutic dilem mas the reader is called on to contemplate. Strether is amused at his bewilderment-and his sense of fun helps to keep the reader entertained but his interpretive quandaries are never an idle game. Unlike The Sacred Fount, where anger at the narrator may interfere with reflection about the hermeneutic implications of his idiosyncracies, even Strether's most bun gling or baffied moments never cause us to lose sympathy with him. The Ambassadors delicately balances involvement and detachment-keeping us engaged with Strether so that we appreciate the urgency of the dilemmas he faces, but holding us back from immersion in his world so that we can evaluate his efforts to understand and reflect about their epistemological implications. Complaints such as Leavis's are a reminder, however, that even at its best moments James's wager is still a wager and that for readers with certain kinds of expectations it will always fail to compensate ade quately for what it forces them to give up.
Although Chad bewilders Strether, James does not render his unreflec13James, Art of the Novel, p. 227.
tive experience with the immediacy Ford gives to primordial perception. We see Strether's confusion indirectly, as he gropes uncertainly from one interpretive hypothesis to another, or as he reflects self-consciously about his surprise at Chad's transformation and his inability to account for it. James renders Strether's bewilderment not for its own sake but as an occasion for exploring the acts of reconfiguring his world to which it gives rise. James's dramatic concentration on the composing powers of con sciousness leaves implicit, on the horizon, the vagueness and obscurity of less coherent states of mind. They await Ford to give them center stage. James's depictions of a character' s "point of view" constitute an ongoing exploration of the role of belief in composing and completing our world. The reader's challenge is not only to know Strether's world better than he does by taking fuller, more considered advantage of available clues. James also asks us to understand how Strether understands more acutely than he himself can-to develop a more sophisticated self-consciousness about the processes of interpretation which his groping quest for knowledge dram atizes than even this extraordinarily reflective character can, given his many pressing involvements. Our engagement in Strether's adventure encourages our interest in his quest for knowledge-an involvement we intensify by joining him in projecting hypotheses about the obscure and the undis closed. But our detachment from the objects that preoccupy him is not only a sacrifice of realistic immersion. It is also an opportunity to reflect with more power and penetration than this beleaguered ambassador can often muster about how what he knows is really what he believes.
Quest for Va lidation
The first stage of Strether' s adventure is a crisis in understanding brought on by the many surprises confounding the interpretive scheme he carried with him to Paris. He resolves this crisis by shifting his interpretive frame work. He answers the question "brutalised or refined?" in Chad's favor, and he adopts the belief that the young man's liaison is a "virtuous attach ment" with a noble woman who has improved him. In the second stage of Strether's groping search for "truth," he faces the challenge of refining, extending, and testing these hypotheses. Strether desires, and thinks he finally achieves, "a certitude that has been tested-that has passed through the fire" (2:34-3 5). If Strether's early bewilderment brings to the fore ground the internal workings of signs and interpretation, then his subse quent search for certainty provides James with a dramatic stage for exploring the procedures and standards that understanding employs in its quest for validation. Strether's use of these methods leads not to a single, certain truth but to a stalemate of conflicting views in his confrontation with Sarah Pocock. Part of the reason for their dispute is that Strether misapplies checks that might have kept him more firmly in touch with reality. But their quarrel also suggests that tests for validation cannot always conclusively decide between opposing interpretive schemes.
Strether's first dilemma in his quest for certainty is how to align belief and doubt. He is lured into faith in the nobility of Madame de Vionnet' s character and the innocence of her relation with Chad because his doubts seem progressively unjustified: "He was building from day to day on the possibility of disgust, but each day brought forth meanwhile a new and more engaging bend of the road" (1:257). His early suspicions are hy potheses about how the elements of his experience with Chad and Madame de Vionnet will combine-hypotheses falsified when the disgust they predict does not arrive. Strether responds by projecting new beliefs: "It's a friendship, of a beautiful sort; and that's what makes them so strong. They're straight, they fe el; and they keep each other up" (1:283). The problem with this new formula, however, is that it is based on large, vague terms ("beautiful," "strong," "straight") that stand in need of considerable refinement and critical scrutiny. Strether hesitates to refine them, though, because their indeterminacy encourages his imagination of the wonderful. 14 But if Strether needs new convictions to understand his new world, his danger is that what he takes for granted may trap him in a vicious circle where his beautiful projections confirm themselves by the very force of his will to believe.
In his search for certainty, Strether faces the further problem of deciding whether the mysteries that still linger after his conversion are puzzles that can be solved by extending his new framework or anomalies that should lead him to discard it. The tests at issue here are comprehensiveness and coherence. In a characteristic attempt to grasp the individual through the type, Strether casts Madame de Vionnet as a ''femme de monde" and discovers unexpectedly that this category is "indeed various and multifold. She had aspects, characters, days, nights ... by a mysterious law of her own .... She was an obscure person, a muffied person one day, and a showy person, an uncovered person the next" (1:271). Here Strether thinks that the law of her kind, once elaborated in all its complexity, and adjusted to Madame de Vionnet's individuality, will account for her varieties and justify his faith in her as a genius of civilized graciousness. But elsewhere he finds in her manifold aspects not an indication of a need to refine his framework but a cause for doubt about its assumptions: "she was so odd a mixture of lucidity and mystery. She fe ll in at moments with the theory about her he most cherished, and she seemed at others to blow it into air. She spoke now as if her art were all an innocence, and then again as if her innocence were all an art" (2:115-16). Both levels of belief are at stake here-the hypotheses that type and compose her but that her inconsistencies threaten, and Strether's suppositions about her hidden sides which seem to deserve trust one moment and suspicion the next. Strether's difficulty is that there are no fixed, infallible rules for distinguishing a falsifying anomaly from a solvable puzzle.
Strether makes himself vulnerable by sidestepping this problem. Al though he claims to desire a strenuously tested certitude, he again and again shows himself eager simply to believe. As little Bilham warns him, "you're not a person to whom it's easy to tell things you don't want to know" (1:202). And Strether himself finds comfort in his sense "that he was free to believe in anything that from hour to hour kept him going" (2:173). Beliefs may indeed vindicate themselves by their ability to keep interpretation in motion-to continue leading to useful understanding. But this may also indicate that they are simply reinforcing one another. Strether claims later "that he had really been trying all along to suppose nothing. Ve rily, verily, his labour had been lost. He found himself sup posing innumerable and wonderful things" (2:226). Strether cannot avoid suppositions to make sense of his world and to deal with its hidden sides. But by replacing his earlier naive suspicions with an equally one-sided faith, Strether risks the kind of fixation and overextension of belief which gets the narrator of The Sacred Fount into trouble.
So far we have uncovered several criteria for validity which Strether applies (or should apply) in his quest for certitude: criticism of belief by doubt, coherence in assimilating anomalous aspects to the whole, and the power to provide unbroken comprehension. In each case Strether makes himself vulnerable to blindness by misusing these checks even as he opens himself to insight by exploiting the revelatory capacities of understanding which they attempt to control. There is one further criterion for validity which is at least as important as the others, if not more so, in Strether's search for certainty-agreement with other observers. Much of the drama of the middle stage of The Ambassadors derives from Strether's groping efforts to check and refine his new hypotheses by discussing them with others. Strether finds that the gap between selves may create a frustrating obstacle not only for understanding but also for verification. Because Strether's understanding of Chad and Madame de Vionnet depends so thoroughly on belief, he can validate it only by resorting to persuasion by demonstrating the power of his convictions to win the agreement of others. Intersubjectively sharable or solipsistically isolating-this is the test for truth or falsity which, he fe els, his hypotheses must pass.
Things are not so simple, however. As Strether soon discovers, there can be conflicting, mutually exclusive communities of belief, so that the quest for validity becomes a choice of allegiances. What persuades one group may leave another skeptical or blindly uncomprehending. Agree ment with others may be communal solipsism. Even finding a basis for shared understanding . within one and the same community may be a difficult task, since its members are other to each other as well as to other groups. All of these complications hamper Strether' s efforts to mediate between the opposing worlds of Paris and Wo ollett.
In his futile attempt to persuade Wo ollett to share his new vision of Chad and Madame de Vionnet, Strether writes and writes and writes to Mrs. Newsome, and sends telegram after telegram across the Atlantic. He shows a passion "for keeping things straight, for the happy forestalment of error. No one could explain better when needful, nor put more con science into an account or a report; which burden of conscience is perhaps exactly the reason why his heart always sank when the clouds of explanation gathered. . . . A personal relation was a relation only so long as people either perfectly understood or, better still, didn't care if they didn't. From the moment they cared if they didn't it was living by the sweat of one's brow" ( 1: 141 ). This passage foreshadows one of the novel's grandest iron ies-that the more Strether writes to ward off the need for explanations, the more confusion and miscomprehension he creates. Strether may con scientiously wish to keep Wo ollett posted on what he finds in Paris, but unfortunately for him even the most literal-minded report cannot confine itself to a neutral empiricism. It must make sense of its evidence by composing and even creating it according to hypotheses and assumptions it must ask its readers to share. Strether understands Paris only by con verting to new beliefs, and Wo ollett can only comprehend what he reports by sharing his convictions-and will only accept its validity if fully per-suaded of them, which cannot happen without Wo ollett losing its identity as Wo ollett. Strether' s dilemma suggests that we cannot understand a message unless we are able to adopt its perspective, and that we will not regard it as truthful unless it persuades us to make this identification more than a temporary leap of faith.
Strether is beset by moral scruples throughout the novel-a desire not to seem to have betrayed Mrs. Newsome or to have departed from neu trality even after he takes sides with Madame de Vionnet. But his many pangs of conscience only show how impossible neutrality is in any conflict about meaning inasmuch as interpreters dispute each other's readings by contesting each other's beliefs. Strether foretells his own story when he reflects that relations go smoothly only as long as the parties either under stand each other or do not care if they do not-either sharing convictions that make them relatively transparent to each other, or choosing not to let mutual opacity lead to conflict. Wo ollett does not understand, and it cares about its lack of comprehension. Strether must then decide whether this disagreement invalidates his findings-or whether it merely shows· that any community will invariably dispute the interpretations of others with different assumptions and convictions.
As an experienced mediator between America and Europe, Maria Gos trey would seem particularly well equipped to help Strether here. Her role in the novel demonstrates the hermeneutic function of the Jamesian .ficelle.
In his preliminary statement, James describes her scenes with Strether as "a relation the fortunate friction of which projects light, the light of inter pretation and illustration, upon all that passes before them, upon all causes and effects."15 She is more than a simple vehicle for Strether's comments on his experiences, however, and she switches her role in his quest at a crucial moment in such a way as to accentuate his hermeneutic plight. Introduced as "a general guide ... to 'Europe' " (1:18), Miss Gostrey enters the novel as an authority with privileged knowkdge-"the mistress of a hundred cases or categories, . . . as equipped in this particular as Strether was the reverse" ( l: l l ). If Paris takes Strether' s categories by surprise, her superior vocabulary may help him learn the new types and formulas he needs. Moreover, "unaccustomed to grope" (and thus much 15James, "Project," p. 413. In seeking to justify Maria's role by explaining its herme neutic significance, I take issue with James's suggestion in his preface that she has a "false unlike poor Strether), she seems to have a "prophetic vision''; "she was never quite sure of what she heard as distinguished from things . . . she only extravagantly guessed" -and guessed with astonishing penetration and accuracy, from the merest clues, such as the way Mrs. Newsome does her hair (1:226, 133, 54; see 1:67). Reminiscent of James's praise of the sensitive interpreter's power to "guess the unseen from the seen" and "trace the implications of things," Maria Gostrey provides a model of the illu minating imagination for Strether to emulate. A foil to the often bewil dered Strether, she personifies hermeneutic mastery.
In all of these ways, James establishes Maria early on as an authority in the well-known convention of a guide or teacher who helps a quester on a journey through unfamiliar terrain. But James introduces this authority only to withdraw her. Strether's quest becomes most complicated at pre cisely the moment when Miss Gostrey leaves Paris after learning that she knows too much-that she is a childhood friend of the woman in Chad' s life. When she returns, Maria tells Strether: "Well, I promise you not again to leave you, but it will only be to follow you. Yo u've got your momentum and can toddle alone" (2:39). He is now on his own, if as yet not quite steady on his fe et.
Maria's disappearance and return as a follower rather than a leader transforms her from an authority into an equal interlocutor. An authority is a privileged other who simplifies the test of intersubjective agreement by introducing an a priori hierarchy. Agreement with the proven judge settles a question once and for all. By switching from authority to inter locutor, Maria changes from a privileged other into an other pure and simple-an aid to interpretation but not an end to its trials. By setting her up as an authority only to withdraw her, James invokes the reader's (and Strether's) desire for unequivocal rankings of meaning and value only to fr ustrate it. This blockage offers itself as a commentary on the status of authority by demystifying its claim to stand outside the hermeneutic field. It shows that an authority is simply an interpreter whose experience, training, and skill have entitled him or her to special powers and rights a grant of privileges which can be withdrawn or, as in Maria's case, renounced.
As Strether's favorite conversational partner, Maria Gostrey participates prominently in the alternation between "picture" and "scene" which is one of the major fe atures of the late style. In his preface James describes how a late work such as The Ambassadors or The Wings of the Dove "sharply divides itself. .. into the parts that prepare, that tend in fact to over-prepare, for scenes, and the parts, or otherwise into the scenes, that justify and crown the preparation."16 Here as before James's representational practice parallels his concern with the dynamics of understanding. The alternation between picture and scene reenacts in James's mode of representation the dialectic between subjectivity and intersubjectivity which characterizes Strether's quest for validity. The "pictures" portray the groping attempts ofStrether's consciousness to compose new constructs for understanding or to revise existing ones in light of recently acquired evidence. The "scenes" dramatize his efforts to check and refine his revised beliefs with others. The back and-forth movement between these two methods of depiction elevates into a formal principle the interaction between two ways ofknowing-reflective assimilation of new experience and the testing, expansion, and refinement of these findings in the arena of differing perspectives. It has been argued that James's "pictures" take over the traditional function of dramatic action by introducing new information about the characters. 17 The reason is that they depict the assimilation of new parts into Strether's growing and changing sense of the whole-a work of figuration which adds appropri ateness to calling them "pictures" if the term implies framing, arranging, and ordering an area of vision.
The "scenes" play off against each other the two main functions of language. Not only does Strether use language to communicate (inquiring, explaining, and seeking to persuade) ; he also shows how language can aid reflection by presenting the self to itsel£ Maria Gos trey invokes this second function of language whenever she questions Strether because she "but desired to help his lucidity" (2:42). The hermeneutic benefits of such self presentation explain why Strether fe els, even after Maria has discarded the robes of authority, that a conversation with her is "an interview by which ... he fe lt his sense of things cleared up and settled" (2:45). ratio of consonance and dissonance between Strether's private musings and his public testing may fascinate other readers because of the challenge it poses to understand Strether's story better than he does himself A reader with just such a sensibility, Percy Lubbock reports that in the "pictures"
Strether "sees, and we with him; but when he talks it is almost as though we were outside him and away from him altogether."19 The movement back and forth between participating in Strether' s private vision and stand ing away to criticize it reduplicates in the reader's own experience the dialectic between projecting hypotheses and testing them which underlies James's use of pictures and scenes.
Strether' s quest for certitude comes to a climax in perhaps the most dramatic, most amusing scene in the novel-his open, full-blown con frontation with Sarah Pocock over Madame de Vionnet and Chad. This scene is a simultaneously funny and disheartening demonstration of how mutual misunderstanding can escalate into irreconcilable conflict. Sarah first challenges Strether's view of Madame de Vionnet: "Do you consider her even an apology for a decent woman?" (2:202). To which he replies: "She has struck me from the first as wonderful" (2:202). His fuller rebuttal then follows:
"I find in her more merits than you would probably have patience with my counting over. And do you know," he enquired, "the effect you produce on me by alluding to her in such terms? It's as if you had some motive in not recognising all she has done for your brother, and so shut your eyes to each side of the matter, in order, whichever side comes up, to get rid of the other.
I don't, you must allow me to say, see how you can with any pretence to candour get rid of the side nearest you. . . . Yo u don't, on your honour, appreciate Chad's fortunate development?" "Fortunate?" she echoed again. And indeed she was prepared. "I call it hideous." (2:204-5)
The standoff between "hideous" and "fortunate" recapitulates and brings to a crisis Strether's earlier interpretive conflicts-"pagan or gentleman?", "brutalised or refined?"
Strether' s dispute with Sarah might seem less a disagreement in under standing, however, than a difference in evaluation. Do they perhaps see the same thing in Chad and Madame de Vionnet, but Strether valuing what Sarah disparages? If so, then their dispute would not be a clash between mutually exclusive interpretations; rather, it would be a disagree ment about the significance of something even though they agree about its meaning. 20 Such is not the case, however. Strether charges Sarah with a lack of candor for refusing to admit what he believes no one could avoid seeing. She does not see what he does in Madame de Vionnet, however, and would not acknowledge the elements in his composition if (as he offers here) he patiently counted them over for her. Nor does she admit any transformation in Chad. As Strether has already noted with dismay: "I can't surprise them into the smallest sign of his not being the same old Chad they've been for the last three years glowering at across the sea" (2: 111 ). Sarah and Strether do not see the same reality and assign it a different value. Rather, they inhabit different, irreconcilable worlds because they see a different Chad, a different Madame de Vionnet, and a different relation between them.
21
Strether's conflict with Sarah raises one more time, and with a culmi nating urgency, the question that has hovered over his history ever since his early bewildered inability to categorize Chad: Is the real single and determinate, or multiple and dependent on interpretation? In this case, is one of them wrong, or is reality more various than Strether had previously thought? Earlier, when he first notices that the Po cocks do not see what he does, Strether wonders: "Did he live in a false world, a world that had grown simply to suit him, and was his present slight irritation [at their blindness] . . . but the alarm of the vain thing menaced by the touch of 20The opposition between meaning and significance has its roots in Gottlob Frege's famous distinction between Sinn (meaning) and Bedeutung (reference). Frege argues that different meanings can attach to the same reference. For example, the Sinn of "the morning star" and "the evening star" is different, but they have the same Bedeutung (the planet Ve nus). See Frege, " U ber Sinn und Bedeutung" (I 892), in Funktion, Begrif f, Bedeutung (Gottingen: Va ndenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1966), pp. 40-65. In a revision and extension of Frege, E. D. Hirsch, Jr., contends that the same meaning can have different references. For Hirsch, the "meaning" of a text is a stable, determinate object; it is what the author intended, and it never changes. This self-identical "meaning" can be given different "significance," he claims, if it is evaluated according to diverging standards or applied to various purposes. See Hirsch, "Objective Interpretation," in validity in Interpretation (New Haven, Conn. : Ya le University Press, 1967), pp. 209-12. I argue that the standoff between Strether and Sarah throws into question the ability of this kind of distinction to settle interpretive disputes. Chad may be the shared topic of their remarks, but they construe him so differently that they seem not to be referring to the same object.
21 0n the refusal of perspectives to harmonize in James, also see Stephen Donadio, Nietzsche, Henry James, and the Artistic Will (New Yo rk : Oxford University Press, 1978), pp. 173-76.
the real? Wa s this contribution of the real possibly the mission of the Pococks? ... Had they come in short to be sane where Strether was destined to fe el that he himself had only been silly?" (2:81). "Sane or silly?" -this pair of alternatives suggests that one party must be wrong if the other is right. Reality is unequivocally there, Strether assumes, and either he has found it, or he has not and the Pococks have. Strether rejects the possibility that his view is invalid-that he is solip sistically deluded, extravagant in his imaginings, and excessive in his will ingness to believe: "He glanced at such a contingency, but it failed to hold him long when once he had reflected that he would have been silly, in this case, with Maria Gostrey and little Bilham, with Madame de Vionnet and little Jeanne, with Lambert Strether, in fine, and above all with Chad Newsome himsel£ Wo uldn't it be found to have made more for reality to be silly with these persons than sane with Sarah and Jim?" (2:81). Strether defends his sense of reality by appealing to agreement with others. But he appeals only to one community of belief and thus leaves himself pitted against the group he rejects. He implicitly charges Wo ollett with communal solipsism, but Sarah could arrive at an opposite result through the same procedure: Wo uld it not make more for "reality" to agree with Mrs. Newsome than with Madame de Vionnet? There is, of course, also the further problem (which Strether does not consider) that deception may undermine his agreement with the Parisians. But there is yet another possibility as well: What ifStrether is simultaneously silly and sane, deluded and wise? What if reality is not univocal and straightforwardly "there," but plural, varying with different constructions, so that one world's silliness is another world's sanity? Or, even more paradoxically, what if it is both at the same time? The deceived, deluded Strether is out of touch with a reality indepedent of him. But the wise Strether who appreciates developments Sarah does not see has discovered that the world is more various than he had earlier known.
The novel's omniscient narrative voice might seem to prejudge these issues in favor of the determinacy of the real. The narrator might seem to represent an independent truth that the other perspectives in the work are more or less distant from and that Strether has not yet found. James's narrator is much more complex and paradoxical than this, however, and his contradictions reinforce the novel's two-sidedness about reality. The narrator's pretense that the story he is relating is a history that actually occurred alternates with an awareness that to narrate is to play a game whose moves depend on the choices he makes. Both attitudes can be seen, for example, in one of his first intrusions: "He was burdened, poor Strether-it had better be confessed at the outset-with the oddity of a double consciousness" (1:5). Strether's ambivalence is a state of affairs independent of the narrator, which he would be dishonest not to disclose, but his interjection also insists that he knows it is entirely his decision how much to tell about his hero, in what way, and when.
The narrative voice in The Ambassadors is unusually self-conscious about its status as an artifice-almost coy at times (as in this example) about invoking privileges long established as conventional. Its self-consciousness is in part an acknowledgment that its privileges are conventions. It is also linked to the narrator' s frequently almost heady sense of his powers capacities for invention and discovery which he enjoys because he is not just copying but creating. The playful tone of even James's most elaborate sentences and complicated scenes suggests that the exercise of his freedom and power is a constant source of pleasure and excitement for him-and that he knows that it is and wants us to share the fun. In his joyful, celebratory self-consciousness about his powers, James's narrative voice is less a limit on meaning than evidence of its capacities to expand.
James finds third-person narration especially congenial because it allows him to combine self-conscious control and creative expansiveness in a greater, more subtle variety of ways than a fully dramatized narrator permits. The flexibility and complexity of the narrator's guidance of the reader are further reasons why James's wager in The Ambassadors pays off more reliably than in The Sacred Fo unt. There James manipulates the reader's attitude toward the narrator by setting up an oscillation between criticism and collaboration which can tip over into unproductive annoyance. The third-person narration of The Ambassadors not only allows James to control his reader' s response more closely. It also enables him to play on a wider range of reactions between the poles of detachment and participation. The Ambassadors calls on the reader for a considerable variety of responses, from lighthearted amusement at Strether's foibles and the antics of the Pococks to almost elegaic sympathy with him and Madame de Vionnet in mourning his losses and her suffering. The reader's movement along this range should be fe lt as pleasurable because it provides an opportunity to appreciate and enlarge our capacities to mean and to understand.
There is the risk, of course, that the reader may fe el overwhelmed by James's semantic inventiveness rather than encouraged to grow to meet its challenges. But this is more of a risk in Th e Sacred Fo unt where the egotistical narrator seems to wish to facilitate only his own hermeneutic abilities. When he enlists others-including the reader-it is mainly to justify himsel£ The narrator of The Ambassadors describes himself as Strether' s friend, and he seeks to be the reader's. His friendship consists of his offer to help us expand our powers to interpret and signify, even as we recognize as well the anguish and uncertainties that can accompany their trials.
Monistic Reality /Pluralistic Interpretation
Strether' s groping quest for knowledge reaches a climax during the country outing where the reality of Chad and Madame de Vionnet' s relationship finally forces itself upon him. As he thinks to himself, "There were things . . . it was impossible to blink" (2:264)-and the impossibility of blinking is, for James, the constraining force of the real. The shock of "the deep, deep truth of the intimacy revealed" between Chad and Madame de Vionnet defies Strether's interpretive constructs (2:266). Strether is sur prised because his many suppositions had excluded the aspect of the couple' s relation which now presents itsel£ His bewilderment exposes the extent to which his previous "reality" had been a structure of hypotheses-beliefs that fit parts into a whole now upset by this anomaly, guesses about the behind and the beyond now conclusively falsified.
Maria Gostrey had "prefigured the possibility of a shock that would send [Strether] swinging back to Mrs. Newsome" in "a revulsion in favour of the principles of Wo ollett" (2:296). She discovers, however, that "the shock had descended and that he hadn't, all the same, swung back" (2:296--97). This is perhaps the most surprising aspect of Strether's enlighten ment-that the discovery of his mistake does not cause him to abandon his interpretive framework and the allegiances that inform it. Instead of radically transforming his scheme for understanding as he did earlier in response to Chad's gray hair and Madame de Vionnet' s gracious civility, Strether modifies his construct to remedy his error at the same time that he finds new confirmation for it. Instead of conceding victorious correct ness to Sarah Pocock' s view of the indecent Parisian siren who has wrought a hideous demoralization of the young American, Strether deepens, ex tends, and refines his original understanding of Madame de Vionnet as a noble sufferer who deserves his support and of Chad as her perhaps too little grateful beneficiary who owes her his ongoing allegiance. Strether's hermeneutic conflict with Sarah and Wo ollett is reconfirmed at the very moment when it might seem finally resolved. By vindicating Wo ollett's supposition of a guilty intimacy and correcting Strether on this score, James asserts that reality is single and ultimately there. But then he under cuts this assertion by discrediting Wo ollett after crediting its hold on the facts.
The chapters that follow Strether's surprising discovery balance monism and pluralism against each other. Strether's last conversations with Chad and Madame de Vionnet play out the irony that Wo ollett was right but wrong at the same time, just as Strether was wrong yet also profoundly right. Strether has answered the question "brutalised or refined?" as his final advice to Chad shows: "Your value has quintupled" (2: 312) and "You'll be a brute, you know-you'll be guilty of the last infamy-if you ever forsake her" (2:308). The term "brute" has a different meaning here than it has in Wo ollett' s lexicon or than it had for Strether when he associated it with the "pagan." One reason interpretations can disagree is that any single word can have many different definitions. The meaning in force in any given usage may vary, as it does here, according to the context of the message and the purpose it serves. Strether similarly preserves but also radically redefines his typing of Madame de Vionnet as an experienced femme de monde. Sarah may consider her coarse and immoral, but Strether still appreciates her subtlety and grace. To be a woman of the world does not only mean, however, to be a mistress of social forms. Strether modifies and extends this category to include his new knowledge that such a woman may have deep reserves of emotion, suffering, and fe ar. Although Strether adjusts his types to accommodate the new realities he has discovered, these variations demonstrate that interpretive categories are internally hetero geneous and consequently contestable.
Why does Strether' s awakening not lead him to abandon his earlier readings entirely? The answer is yet another illustration of James's interest in the circularity of interpretation. Instead of rebounding to the principles of Wo ollett as Maria Gos trey had fe ared, Strether "reverted in thought to his old tradition, the one he had been brought up on and which even so many years oflife had but little worn away; the notion that the state of the wrongdoer, or at least this person's happiness, presented some special difficulty" (2:272). This reversion allows Strether to graft the unfamiliar onto the familiar-to extend a long-held scheme for understanding where he had fe lt compelled before to discard all of his previous constructs. It is therefore less a regression than a progression. It not only restores a sense of continuity to Strether's life but also enables him to save and correct his reading of Paris. Thanks to the notion that the wrongdoer deserves sym-pathy, Strether preserves the principle of appreciative revelation which guided his willingness to believe. At the same time, however, he corrects this principle by demystifying seemingly innocent but deceptive surfaces. Reconciling belief and suspicion, he achieves a postcritical faith.
Putting this new hermeneutic attitude into practice, Strether remains an active interpreter even after an awakening that might seem to suggest he abandon hypotheses altogether. Even to the end, for example, Madame de Vionnet "puzzled and troubled him. . . . He fe lt what he had fe lt before with her, that there was always more behind what she showed, and more and more again behind that" (2:283). Once again Strether confronts in her the problem of hidden sides-the question of whether to trust or suspect what is out of view. If, earlier, Strether had believed her too much and doubted too little, he aligns these two opposing principles during their last meeting by balancing sympathetic understanding of her unhappiness against wariness of the lie she is trying to carry on. Ta king this dialectic of faith and suspicion still further, Strether is also both appreciative and skeptical of her reading of Chad: "she had but made Chad what he was so why could she think she had made him infinite? She had made him better, she had made him best, she had made him anything one would; but it came to our friend with supreme queerness that he was none the less only Chad. . . . The work, however admirable, was nevertheless of the strict human order" (2:284). In an ironic reversal, the once all-credulous Strether criticizes Madame de Vionnet for believing too excessively in Chad and thus mystifying herself about her own creation-an admirable work, but one finite in its limitations. Irony built upon irony, Strether's critique of her reading is also a critique of his own interpretation of Chad. The young man is transformed, Strether thinks; he is not the old Chad but he is still only Chad, capable of putting self-interest over care for others.
As Strether reviews and revises his many interpretations at the end, he also applies his dialectic of faith and suspicion to one of the major mysti fications that had been practiced on him. Although little Bilham may have lied, Strether tells Miss Gostrey, "it was but a technical lie-he classed the attachment as virtuous. That was a view for which there was much to be said-and the virtue came out for me hugely. There was of course a great deal of it. I got it full in the face, . and I haven't, you see, done with it yet" (2:299). The bemused irony with which Strether mocks himself here com bines both revelation and unmasking. He uncovers the deception he fe ll for, but he defends the values he believed in. It was a lie, but only technically so, inasmuch as Strether holds to the truth of the relationship's nobility even as he acknowledges its lack of platonic innocence. Just as the term "brute" takes on a different sense at the end, so does the word "virtue" (no longer bound up with chastity for Strether but retaining the connotation that the attachment has value because it enhances two lives).
Strether's postcritical faith has two dimensions that reflect James's con tradictory allegiances to reality and interpretation. It is a method of achiev ing a more accurate understanding of the way things are through a mutual correction of belief and doubt. But it is also a unique interpretive attitude in itself, one that conflicts with different ways of revealing and unmasking. Wo ollett, of course, has its own suspicions about Madame de Vionnet and its own faith in the values Chad should pursue. Although criticizing his excessive willingness to believe gives Strether a firmer hold on the simple, undeniable "truth," his postcritical faith in Paris still leaves him at odds with the convictions and suspicions of Wo ollett. James's depiction of the correcting interaction of belief and doubt affirms the singleness and deter minacy of the real. But he at the same time acknowledges the multiplicity and variability of the forms that faith and suspicion can take in supporting opposing interpretations. This duality explains the paradox of The Ambas sadors' ending-its simultaneous affirmation of monistic realism and her meneutic multiplicity.
James' s method of depicting Strether's enlightenment holds in tension the opposition between interpretation and reality. Even in asserting the independence of the real, James is not a simple empiricist. Strether's awak ening is an experience of interpretation from start to finish-not a straight forward confrontation with brute fact. The dramatic structure of his revelation reflects James's interest in interpretation as an act of composition. Strether begins his awakening by continuing the work of fitting the figures on the river into the frame of the painting with which he has been com posing the landscape all afternoon: "It was suddenly as if these figures, or something like them, had been wanted in the picture, had been wanted more or less all day; and had now drifted into sight, with the slow current, on purpose to fill up the measure" (2:256). In a circular manner, Strether understands the individual here by relating it to a type, just as the addition of new particulars adjusts and fills out his sense of the whole. As the boat approaches in the next fe w sentences, part and whole continue to refine, extend, and mutually confirm each other. But suddenly; with the force of a gestalt shift, Strether realizes that the lady with the pink parasol and the coatless gentleman are Madame de Vionnet and Chad. The combination of the gradual and the sudden in James's portrayal of this recognition scene dramatizes the roles of continuity and discontinuity in interpretation: the refinement and extension of an existing scheme for understanding, as well as the abrupt shift from one paradigm to another when a construct breaks down because anomaly defies assimilation. 22 Focusing on Strether's processes of construal, James depicts this scene with an indirectness typical of his late manner. Even when Strether con fronts reality, James is more interested in how his hero understands than in what he sees. Strether learns the truth about Chad and Madame de Vionnet not by facing unmediated facts but by following out the impli cations of various clues. Never given direct evidence of their intimacy, Strether must ponder a series of small, subtle signs requiring skillful reading: the boat "wavered" and "stood off'' for a moment (2:257); they almost " 'cut' him, . . . on the assumption that he wouldn't know it" (2:258); "they had something to put a face upon," Strether guesses, because Madame de Vionnet talks too much, and in French (2:261); they "must have communicated all in silence" for a brief moment in deciding their strategy on the boat, and this suggests deep reserves of intimacy (2:263); 22 According to Charles R. Anderson, this is one of "a half-dozen major scenes in The Ambassadors that are described in language that increasingly suggests the mode of the Impressionist painters." Although Strether begins his outing by seeing the countryside through a framed landscape by the Barbizon painter Lambinet, Anderson argues that the scenery more and more "brings to mind Manet, Renoir, Monet, and the others." In proposing an epistemological basis for this parallel in representational technique, he claims that both James and the French Impressionists regard "consciousness as something not fixed and stable but as ever in flux" (Person, Place, and Thing, pp. 239, 270, 240) . Both James and the French Impressionists do indeed experiment self-consciously with the relation between consciousness and representation in their different media. But important epistemological distinctions divide them. The painters seek a return to the so-called primitive, natural eye. Their program calls on the artist to strip away cultural conventions for seeing and to paint instead "what you really see, not what you think you ought to see," to render "your own naive impression of the scene before you" (Linda Nochlin, ed., For James, however, if we were to cast off our beliefs about the world, we would not see anything at all. Almost diametrically opposed to the Impressionist painters, James em phasizes that conventional constructs necessarily shape the way we see-and that "it is art that makes life, makes importance, for our consideration," in the ringing words of his famous letter to H. G. Wells (The Letters of Henry Ja mes, ed. Percy Lubbock [New Yo rk: Scribner's, 1920], 2:490; original emphasis). This phrase could stand as the epigraph to the chapter where Strether undertakes his rural trek. Strether reverses the French Impres sionists by self-consciously using culture to interpret nature. Because James regards understanding as a constructive activity, he does not depict subjective experience as a formless flux. 9 2 most conclusively, they return to Paris without shawl or overcoat, presum ably left behind at their country rendezvous.
In order to reach the simple truth of their intimacy, Strether must undertake complicated acts of construal of the sort his entire story consists of-projecting hypotheses on the basis of incomplete evidence. In their extreme indirectness, all of these dues insist on their status as signs, absent from what they present, withholding the secret of the couple's liaison even as they deliver incontrovertible proof of it. His supposition of a guilty intimacy is justified by nothing more or less than its aid as a principle of composition. Thanks to it, Strether thinks, "many things, ... as it were, fitted together" (2:26o). Although Strether regrets all that he had supposed about Chad and Madame de Vionnet, he can only disclose the secret of their relation with the aid of assumptions and hypotheses. 23 James portrays Strether's encounter with reality as thoroughly hermeneutic and semiotic.
James also expresses his contradictory allegiances to reality and inter pretation by emphasizing that Strether came perilously close to not being undeceived. James suggests again and again that only by the merest chance did Strether happen upon Chad and Madame de Vionnet in a compro mising situation. Strether "selected almost at random" the goal of his outing (2:245), and the sheer accident of his wanderings brought him to the Cheval Blanc for dinner. Accident piled upon accident, it was only chance again that Chad and Madame de Vionnet should have arranged to dine there too. "It was too prodigious, a chance in a million," Strether thinks (2:257)-so much so that he worries the couple will think he had been stalking them. The chapter that recounts his revelation is filled with references to "the mere miracle of the encounter" (2:258)-"it was all too lucky" (2:26o; original emphasis)-a "charming chance," as one sentence repeats three times (2:259-60). The extraordinary measure of contingency 23Here and elsewhere when I insist that understanding for James is a matter of believing, I am arguing against the persistent, widespread notion that Strether errs by categorizing and theorizing about his experiences instead of simply accepting life's unstructured fluidity. For example, to cite an especially influential instance of this view, R. W Stallman criticizes Strether because he "prejudges events by theorizing about them." Instead, Stallman argues, James's hero must learn "what it means to be alive in Time Now-how to take things as they come" (The Houses That Ja mes Built [East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1964), pp. 34, 41). Instead of suggesting that consciousness can do without categories, presuppositions, or projections, James's wariness of the dangers of dogmatic rigidity stems precisely from his awareness that to know is always to compose and complete the world-and that one should consequently be particularly cautious to avoid a premature fixation of belie£ here suggests the weakness of the double negative in James's description of the real as what "cannot not" be known. The chance quality of Strether's awakening is the dramatic equivalent ofJames's sense that the real is at best absent, presented precariously through the mediation of signs that may mislead as well as lead.
James's handling of time further undermines the empirical implications of Strether's awakening. A confrontation with fact might seem to demand the immediacy of the present as its temporal setting. But James depicts in tandem the immediacy of Strether's present experience and the mediating musings of the future which reflect back on it as part of the past. The Ambassadors resorts to this temporal double vision frequently, as when James renders his hero' s discovery of Chad' s transformation by balancing what Strether fe els at the time against what he thinks about later. The bewildered Strether's immediate impressions come in "a crowded rush . . . both vague and multitudinous," but then "our friend was to go over [them] afterwards again and again'' (1:136, 135). The two levels of meaning in voked here portray interpretation as an act of reflecting on the unreflected examining retrospectively what was only tacitly or vaguely understood at the moment and thereby hoping to compose it more coherently. This temporal double vision recurs during the chapter that recounts Strether's awakening. After he encounters Chad and Madame de Vionnet, the narrative shifts from the simple present to a complex dialectic of the present coupled with Strether's retrospective reflections on it: "He was to reflect later on and in private ... " (2:259). Or again, in a mounting series of consecutive clauses: "Strether indeed was afterwards to remember . . . Strether was to remember afterwards further . . . he was to remember further still ... " (2:260). James holds two pictures against each other simultaneously-Strether's encounter with Chad and Madame de Vionnet, and the hero lost in thought on his bedroom sofa until the early hours of the following morning. This conjoined rendering of the scene itself and of Strether's recollection of its meaning is a more complicated version of Isabel Archer's all-night vigil of meditation, where James depicts the pres ent of self-consciousness as it looks back over the past. By invoking a doubled temporality, James plays with how we live forward but understand backward. He simultaneously shows Strether doing both. Instead of por traying an immediate confrontation with the real, James depicts dialectical movements of interpretation which go back and forth across the tenses of time-focusing on Strether's hermeneutic processes as he sifts and recom poses what was at first ambiguous and obscure.
Ford and Conrad experiment further with the temporal double vision
James employs in The Portrait of a Lady, The Ambassadors, and elsewhere throughout his canon. As Strether thinks back over the clues that betray Chad and Madame de Vionnet's intimacy, he undergoes a process of "delayed decoding," to borrow Ian Wa tt' s useful term. 24 As Wa tt suggests, Conrad fragments his narratives so as to postpone the reader's deciphering of their meaning. This repeated delay makes interpreting Conrad's novels an ongoing activity of reflecting on the unreflected-a heightened, more self-conscious version of the dialectic between anticipation and retrospec tion which all reading entails. Ford elevates the duality of living forward and understanding backward into one of the central principles of his doctrine of impressionism. By refusing to narrate straightforwardly, Ford seeks to convey in the very experience of reading a sense of the distance and the tension between the reflected and the unreflected.
Ford and Conrad split apart these two temporal levels of understanding, where James's mode of representation holds them together. This difference goes back once again to James's emphasis on the composing powers of consciousness-here the retrospective fitting together of what may be vague and obscure on its first construal. Ford's and Conrad's readers must go back and forth across the time of reading to clarify retrospectively what a fragmentary presentation may initially leave mysterious. James's readers are induced to undertake a simultaneous double vision paralleling the dialectic of temporal composition in Strether's awakening.
James plays with the contradiction between reality and interpretation down to the very last line of the novel: " 'Then there we are!' said Strether" (2:327). These ordinary words are actually a very unusual way to end a book. They make explicit what most endings do implicitly-announce the arrival at a point of closure, a "there" where everything comes together. Strether' s last words defy the expectation of closure, however, even as they pretend to fulfill it. Their meaning is by no means obvious and unequivocal. This uncertainty calls upon us as readers to wonder where we are indeed, and this question opens up for renewed interpretation the entirety of Strether's story. The ending of The Ambassadors is open in two directions across the horizon of the future, with the uncertainties of Strether's fate in America, and across the horizon of the past, with the meaning of his adventure in Europe offered once again for our contemplation.
Just as these words put an end to the task of interpreting the novel at the same time that they give it a new beginning, so they also both assert and deny the determinacy of reality. They recall similar refrains throughout the novel: "So there they were" (1:n8), for example; "'But there-as usual-we are' " (2: 142). Each ironically emphasizes to the bewildered reader that it is not at all clear where Strether stands. The "there" seems to declare a determinate position, but the obscurity of its meaning makes it indeterminate instead. The word "there" suggests a referential pointing to an independent state of affairs. But the puzzle of figuring out what "there" means insists on its status as a sign that must be interpreted and whose meaning is contained in still other signs. "There we are" -those are the words of an empiricist who believes in reality. But their ambiguity calls attention to the vicissitudes of understanding. We know where we are in James's world more than we do in the fictional universes of Pynchon or Robbe-Grillet. But the puzzle of the Jamesian "there" heralds the modem novel by transforming an indicator of reality into a challenge for interpretation.
Strether'.5 Self-Discovery: The Ethics of Understanding
Strether's concluding words also have moral significance. They culmi nate his debate with Maria Gostrey about his decision to return to Wo ollett. "That, you see, is my only logic," Strether argues; "Not, out of the whole affair, to have got anything for myself ' (2:326) . To which Miss Gostrey replies: "But why should you be so dreadfully right?" (2:326). Generations of readers have indeed disagreed about whether Strether is correct to condemn himself to the confines of Wo ollett and to renounce, at least for himself, the expansive vision of life he endorses at Gloriani's party.
This dispute raises important questions about the relations between ethics and interpretation. James's novel not only explores the epistemology of hermeneutic conflict; it also probes the moral implications of inhabiting a pluralistic universe. If truth is not univocal, does that abandon us to ethical relativism, with no clear-cut standards to decide between right and wrong? If moral standards can be found, what justification can they claim inasmuch as they cannot be guaranteed by anything extrinsic to the field of judgment itself?25 These are crucial questions for understanding James's 25These questions have long occupied James critics. For example, Christof We gelin 9 6 position in the history of the novel. By affirming the possibility of ethical judgment, James carries on the great tradition in the novel which stretches from Richardson through Austen to Eliot. But James's approach to ethics is also modem, inasmuch as he questions the very possibility of morality by exposing and exploring its hermeneutic foundations. The debate about the ending of The Ambassadors is a reflection of this two-sidedness-James's assertion through Strether that moral choice is possible, coupled with his suggestion that ethical judgment is nothing more or less than a matter of interpretation, and thus subject to irresolvable conflict.
Strether' s story shows that understanding itself has a moral dimension for James because it can contribute to the self-consciousness of the inter preter and thereby enhance his or her appreciation of obligations and choices. In attempting to understand others Strether increases his under standing of himself There are several reasons why this is so. First of all, and most obvious, Strether's sense of personal identity deepens and expands to the extent that he sees himself reflected in others. He learns about the "me" through its similarities to and differences from the "not-me." Strether is forever discovering analogues of himself-in Way marsh as his guilty conscience, in Jim Pocock as what Mrs. Newsome's husband must be like, in Chad as the beneficiary of chances Strether never had, or in little Bilham as his younger self whom he warns against making his own mistake of argues that The Ambassadors dramatizes "a conflict between different moral sensibil i ties" which shows in tum that James has lost "his faith in the absoluteness of local values" Fogel's claim that it shows Strether's "capacity for disinterested appreciation, which is, for James, the highest form oflove" (Ja mes and the Romantic Imagination, p. 47).
not living. Because self-consciousness is a process of consciousness redu plicating itself, it is aided by identifications like these which show Strether doubles of himself This doubling objectifies the self by transforming its internal obscurities into an external, concrete image Strether can recognize and examine. The distance implicit in every identification is consequently as important as its declaration of a common bond. Strether' s differences from his doubles are as revealing as his similarities to them; part of how Strether discovers himself is by learning how he is not like others. 26 Streth er' s interpretive quest is simultaneously a journey of self-discovery because the very activity of understanding others carries with it all of these possi bilities for clarifying the boundaries of the self and its relatedness to the world. They are only possibilities, however; an interpreter can take more or less advantage of them or, like the narrator of The Sacred Fo unt, neglect them entirely.
Not only are others the objects of Strether's consciousness; he is also the object of the gaze of others, and this too gives rise to reflection on his part. Strether tells Miss Barrace: "I seem to have a life only for other people" (1:269). Strether is under obligation on all sides, and each party defines him differently. For Wo ollett, he is an ambassador who betrays his duty; for Madame de Vionnet, he is a source of help in her attempt to retain Chad; for this young American, Strether is yet another assistant who can help "tum his wheel" (2:278). Strether is indeed all of these things, but at the same time he is none of them. These are conflicting versions of his self-for-others, but none of them match his self-for-himself It seems to be the law of Strether's career in Europe that he be constantly misunder stood. Not simply testimony to the gap between the self and others, the difference between what Strether is for himself and what he is for others provides him with occasion after occasion for articulating his sense of identity. As before, seeing what he is not helps him to clarify what he is. The various misinterpretations of himself with which Strether must deal challenge him to differentiate and make explicit what his aims are, how his relations with others stand, and what is at stake in his adventures.
Strether never attains perfect self-understanding, of course. Once again these opportunities for reflection are nothing more than that-possibilities 26Strether's identifications are, for the most part, conscious and self-conscious. Like James, Conrad is also fascinated with doubles. But as Albert Guerard has pointed out, identification in Conrad is frequently half conscious and unconscious, and for that reason less likely to result in heightened self-understanding than in impulsive, irrational actions.
See Guerard, Conrad the Novelist (1958; rpt. New Yo rk: Atheneum, 1970), pp. 145-51. Strether sometimes engages and sometimes flees. But it is still the case that the self-consciousness of this intensely reflective if fallible character grows more than it might if he were well understood. Because the many conflicts between his self-for-himself and his self-for-others present Strether with a series of double images of himself, they facilitate the reduplication of consciousness which reflection entails.
Strether is particularly prompted to self-consciousness because he is figuratively in bondage to others. As their servant, he struggles under the burden of their demands on him, often with anxiety and usually in suf fe ring. Strether is "constantly accompanied by a sense of the service he rendered" to Chad, for example (1:256). Although he offers his assistance to Madame de Vionnet of his own volition, he fe els controlled by her as well-pinned by a "golden nail" which she had "driven in'' and which "pierced a good inch deeper" every time he visits her (2:23). And, of course, he is under bonda g e to Mrs. Newsome. A figurative slave to these many masters, Strether experiences what Hegel describes in his argument that domination can give rise to the self-consciousness of the oppressed party. Forced to labor under the master's gaze, servants undergo a doubling of consciousness because they must come to terms with the role assigned to them over against their private sense of themselves. Single in conscious ness thanks to his or her ascendancy, the master has less cause for reflec tion. 27 Chad and Mrs. Newsome "have no imagination," and, as Miss Gostrey tells Strether, "There's nothing so magnificent-for making others fe el you" (2:240). They develop less self-awareness than their servant Strether does because, in their mastery, they are not compelled to question themselves by an external imposition of identity. Part of the reason Chad seems shallow and unthinking even to the end is precisely "his knowing how to live" -his talent for making others "the fe eder of his stream" (2:212). Those others-particularly Strether and Madame de Vionnet develop depths of self-consciousness, however, by slaving for him.
The Ambassadors not only dramatizes Strether' s self-discovery; it also calls attention to how reading can lead to self-consciousness. Oncf" again James' s hermeneutic concerns parallel his representational practice-here in his manipulation of the relation between the subjectivity of the reader and textual subjectivity. Reading is capable of inciting self-consciousness because it entails a reduplication of the reader's consciousness. As I animate the acts of another subjectivity in reading, the "real me" of my conscious ness assimilates and confronts the "alien me" not only of the text's con trolling consciousness but also of the consciousness of the characters. These experiences of identification and opposition can promote the doubling of self against self inherent in reflection. 28 What is an implicit possibility of fiction becomes here as before an explicit theme in James's experiments with point of view. Thematizing Strether's perspective elevates into an explicit formal principle the alterna tion implicit in all reading between sharing another consciousness and observing its otherness. By inhabiting Strether's perspective and partici pating in his self-reflections and hermeneutic speculations, we enjoy an unusually intimate relation with the internal workings of another mind. But because we observe and evaluate his acts of interpretation as well especially when the narrator intervenes and recalls our difference from Strether's perspective, or when we shift from a "picture" to a "scene" -our identification with him is accompanied by ever-varying degrees of detachment. By alternately sharing and criticizing Strether's acts of under standing, we as readers set up within ourselves a duplication of our own hermeneutic processes against the hermeneutic processes of another. This doubling offers us an occasion to reflect about the similarity and difference between our own interpretive habits and those activated in the text. We may recognize our interpretive practices by seeing them duplicated at a distance in Strether's consciousness, or we may become clearer about how we know by finding, comically or with sympathy, that it is not how he knows. In either case, as readers of The Ambassadors we are asked to become self-conscious about our own ways of understanding by understanding those of another.
Self-consciousness is for James a value in itself, but he does not suggest that it alone can dictate ethical choices. The Ambassadors depicts duty as a variable construct that can be construed in radically different ways by even the most self-conscious characters. James's novel suggests that the choice of an interpretive attitude is itself an ethical decision. These points are brought home in Strether's climactic confrontation with Sarah Pocock, which I examined earlier as an epistemological conflict; it is also a clash over how to define moral obligation. "What is your conduct," Sarah asks relativistic. In impressing upon Chad his obligations to Madame de Vion net, Strether argues: "You owe her everything-very much more than she can ever owe you. Yo u've in other words duties to her, of the most positive sort; and I don't see what other duties-as the others are presented to you can be held to go before them" (2:313). Although Strether acknowledges here the possibility of different definitions of duty, there is no question that Chad would act immorally if (as he probably will) he abandons the woman who has done so much for him. If James believes in a reality beyond interpretation, so he also holds that a moral truth can sometimes be found which transcends disagreement.
The norm Strether invokes here is existential-the care one person owes another in return for care received. Freedom is James's other highest value. 29 Care and freedom are intrinsic rather than extrinsic values-grounded on the structure of experience, not derived from social convention. They are consequently universals. But they do not resolve once and for all, in an unequivocal manner, every question of judgment and conduct. They are infinitely variable in the ways they can be pursued.
Both the absoluteness and the variability of the value of freedom are evident in Strether's famous advice to little Bilham to believe in "the illusion of freedom; . . . don't be, like me, without the memory of that illusion" (1:218). Strether describes freedom as a state of affairs which exists only if we constitute it-an "illusion" which we must create and sustain for IOI ourselves by taking a revelatory attitude toward the circumstances we find ourselves in. 30 Strether' s advice contains an unequivocal moral imperative: believe in freedom to make freedom possible. The difficulty, though, is that this imperative can realize itself in many ways. Every choice not only embraces some possibilities but also closes off others that haunt the chosen as the ghost of what might have been. Strether' s lamentations about his own mistakes testify to this dialectic, and he later acknowledges that "even when a thing's already nice there mostly is some other thing that would have been nicer-or as to which we wonder if it wouldn't" (2: 139; original emphasis).
The most we can hope for, James seems to suggest, is a sense of integrity-a sense that our lives have composed themselves into a whole that we can accept as our own. Strether claims in his talk with little Bilham that things could not have been different for him, but he fe els some envy of others and not a little dissatisfaction with his own particular lot. He achieves a sense of integrity at the end, in the confidence with which he rejects Maria's offer and accepts the consequences of his actions which await him in America. But the dissatisfaction of some readers with his decision suggests that integrity may take many forms-even what one perspective may regard as genuine self-acceptance another can see as failure, disappointment, a self-deceptive turning away from possibilities worth engaging. By espousing the value of integrity, James asserts that we can live a moral life; but The Ambassadors also shows that integrity, as an ethical goal, is infinitely variable and open to interpretation.
If the imperative of freedom addresses the moral question of what the self should do with itself, then the call of care takes up the complementary problem of how to be with others. But care is similarly a variable imper ative. As an international drama, The Ambassadors explores how conven tions institutionalize ways of being with others. It suggests that there are as many possible forms of personal relations as there are cultural codes. At the end, Strether cuts beneath conventions to their foundation-the goal of establishing community with others, despite our differences with them, a goal that he embraces in his renewed commitment to Madame de Vionnet and that he asks Chad to adopt as well. But to move back from conventions to their existential basis does not resolve the dilemmas created by the distance between selves. It merely displaces them. Strether's communion with Madame de Vionnet still leaves him in conflict with Wo ollett. One of the great ironies of The Ambassadors is that genuine fidelity shown in one direction can seem like betrayal from another perspective. This irony fr ustrates the imperative of care even as Strether acts on it.
From the start of his career, Strether is a figure of solicitude-first enlisted to help Mrs. Newsome by retrieving her son, then to help Madame de Vionnet and Chad against Wo ollett, and finally to help her in her fe ar oflosing him. Solicitude is an equivocal value, however; what seems helpful in the eyes of some can seem hurtful to others. Strether fe els that Sarah Pocock's concern for Chad's welfare is dominating rather than liberating because it would leap in and take over for him instead of enhancing his power to become. In Strether's view, Madame de Vionnet's aid has had exactly the opposite effect on Chad by making his transformation possible. But then Wo ollett envisions her as a dominating rather than liberating figure, and this conflict of interpretations points up once again the insta bility of care as an imperative.
All of these dilemmas and difficulties suggest that James does not regard care as a straightforward standard for judgment and conduct-or perhaps even as an ultimately attainable goal. The Ambassadors does not depict as possible the kind of transcendental communion that, despite her acute sense of human separation (or indeed because of it), Wo olf celebrates in The Jililves. But both novelists do share a sense that overcoming the distance that divides selves is perhaps our most crucial moral and existential aim. James is closer, however, to the tension between faith in care's promise and skepticism about its precarious status, which Thomas Mann voices in the tentative concluding words of The Magic Mo untain: "may it be that Love one day shall mount?"31 Being with others in caring reciprocity may be a supreme obligation ir. James's view. But he does not envision fidelity and community as stabilizing values with the power to transcend all differences. 32
Strether's final decision to return to Wo ollett is both morally justifiable and open to debate-as indeed it should be in a novel that both endorses and calls into question the possibility of ethical judgment. Strether's de- 32My description ofJames's tough-minded recognition of the distance between the self and others disputes Philip Sicker's argument that James believes in a quasi-mystical "penetration of one mind by another" -"an interpenetration of separate centers of con sciousness" through unconscious telepathic communion (see Love and the Quest fo r Identity in the Fiction of Henry Ja mes [Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 1980], p. 123).
Sicker's argument about James would better fit Lawrence or Wo olf parture reflects "his supreme scruple-he wished so to leave what he had forfeited out of account. He wished not to do anything because he had missed something else, because he was sore or sorry or impoverished, because he was maltreated or desperate; he wished to do everything because he was lucid and quiet" (2:294-95). According to this explanation, his choice is defensible because it expresses a newfound sense of integrity. By refusing to seek compensation for what he has lost or suffered, Strether confidently accepts what has been in his history. Rather than fleeing into the "haven of rest" Maria Gostrey offers (2:320), Strether resolutely faces his situation: "I shall see what I can make of it" (2:325). His possibilities may seem limited in Wo ollett, but he will do with them what he can. The reader cannot ignore all Strether gives up in returning to America, however, because James's hero himself is acutely aware of it. Strether's resignation at the end may consequently seem a rather timid response to the imperative of engaging one's possibilities as fully as one's situation allows. Strether's "supreme scruple" may seem overly cautious-as it has to many readers if the challenge of freedom demands vigorous, bold initiatives. The im perative of freedom can justify Strether, but it can also damn him.
So too can the imperative of care. A large part of Strether's justification is his selflessness. He insists on not getting anything for himself for his adventure so that no one can accuse him of pursuing his own personal advantage. He consequently tells Maria Gostrey: "It's you who would make me wrong!" (2:326). But ifhe must leave her for the sake of seeming selfless, his sacrifice may seem undermined by a disturbing irony. Strether gives up his self-interest, but his generosity does not enhance communion with others. His refusal of the self instead isolates him from one of the fe w others who genuinely care about him, and it does little to assuage the many disputes that ravage his world. Furthermore, if Strether rejects Maria because, as Matthiessen argues, he secretly loves Madame de Vionnet, then Miss Gostrey is less a sacrifice to selflessness than a defeated rival in the battle for the hero' s affections. 33 Demystified in this manner, his appeal to the standard of care turns out to be a disguise for dissension. Strether can be defended for eschewing the egotism that fuels conflict in personal relations, or he can be criticized for practicing care imperfectly.
The cause of heightened self-consciousness similarly justifies Strether and condemns him. Strether desires a "final appreciation of what he had done," and he thinks that returning to America will give him the best 33See Matthiessen, Ja mes: The Major Phase, pp. 39-41.
position for observation and reflection: "he was to see, at the best, what Wo ollett would be with everything there changed for him. Wo uldn't that revelation practically amount to the wind-up of his career?" (2:294; original emphasis). Ever in pursuit of greater self-consciousness, Strether envisions himself exploring the meaning of his experience as rigorously and com pletely as he can. But the contradiction here is that he seeks an expanded vision by leaving a marvelous world of cultural value-whether symbol ized by Madame de Vionnet's grand rooms or Maria Gostrey's sparser but still "exquisite" quarters, infused with "beauty and knowledge" (2:325, 326). This world would seem more inspiring than Wo ollett to the devel opment of consciousness and self-consciousness. Strether presents himself at the end as someone who is doing his duty. And indeed he is. But he also is not. He can be def ended and attacked according to each criterion of moral obligation which the novel proposes.
The ending of The Ambassadors is ambiguous because in it James affirms the possibility of making moral choices at the same time that he demon strates their precariousness. The ambiguity ofStrether's decision at the end both asserts a moral resolution to his story (carrying on the tradition of the nineteenth-century novel) and refuses finality by suggesting that this choice is debatable, as all acts and judgments must be in a pluralistic universe with no incontestable hierarchies of meaning and value. Ford calls James "a philosophic anarchist," but his description goes a bit too far. 34 The ending of The Ambassadors might have anarchical implications if James had with held the suggestion that Strether is justified. Conversely, however, a reso lution with more finality and less ambiguity would make James more monistic and less open to interpretive disagreement than Ford rightly senses he is.
Conrad takes the novel further toward modernity by asking more rad ically James's questions about the contingency of all interpretations, stan dards, and institutions. James's bridge over the darkness is the ceaseless meaning-making of consciousness. For Conrad, however, to scrutinize our constructs is to reveal the emptiness that is their substance and the noth ingness that is their ground. Conrad insists on our obligation to follow Marlow in Heart of Darkness when he confronts the nihilistic implications of Kurtz's last words. But he insists as well on our duty, after such an awakening, to reaffirm our commitment to social values and beliefs that are a deception-to join Marlow in lying to the Intended. The ubiquity of the lie in James and Conrad suggests the extent to which, for them, the world is semiotic, an endless and ungrounded chain of signs. But where deception is a hermeneutic dilemma in James's world, Conrad depicts th� lie as our metaphysical situation. Their different interpretations of lying reflect the complementarity of James and Conrad as students of herme neutics. James's epistemological emphasis on belief as a tool for composing an interpretation is extended, reexamined, and redefined by Conrad in his exploration of the ontological status of the convictions and constructions that make up the human world.
